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From time to time, surveys are made of the work of the Supreme
Court for a particular term 1 and a current series of annual articles
reviews the Court's business term by term and comments on some of
its institutional aspects.2 It is proposed in this article to examine the
work which the Court might have done, but did not do during the 1949
term, i.e. the denial of petitions for writs of certiorari and the dismissal
of appeals.' It may be that the work which the Court doesn't do is as
significant for the nation as the work which it does. When it decides
a case involving important matters of public interest, it is making national policy. When it declines to review a case involving important
issues, is it not also determining policy? To be sure, it may review
and reverse a case next year involving the same issue. But it is also
true that it may reverse itself next year, as a justice occasionally will
complain." From the standpoint of national policy, it is not easy to
find any difference.
It is well known that, quantitatively, denials and dismissals far
exceed the number of cases accorded full review. For the 1949 term the
Court wrote 94 opinions,' the smallest number in many years. It refused to consider, either by denying certiorari or by dismissing the
appeal, 1,033 cases, of which 597 ' were on the appellate docket and
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1. See the symposium in 47 CoL. L. REv. 883-1008 (1948), reviewing the Court's
work for the 1946 term.
2. The series of articles in the University of Chicago Law Review by John P.
Frank, 15 U. OF CH. L. REv. 1 (1947) ; 16 U. OF CHL L. REv. 1 (1948) ; 17 U. OF
CHL L. Rv. 1 (1949) ; 18 U. OF Ci. L. REV. 1 (1950).
3. Although there is a technical distinction between the denial of a petition for
a writ of certiorari and the dismissal of an appeal, for the purposes of this article they
are treated together because of the Court's tendency to dispose of appeals in brief
per curiam opinions.
4. "Respect for continuity in Law, where reasons for change are wanting, alone
requires adherence to Trupiano [Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948)]
and other decisions. Especially ought the Court not reinforce needlessly the instabilities of our day by giving fair ground for the belief that Law is the expression of
chance-for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's composition and the contingencies in the choice of successors." Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5. Including per curiam opinions.
6. Including 78 companion cases.
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436 ' on the miscellaneous dockets, by far the majority of the latter
being in forma pauperis. A comparison with the previous year shows
a larger number of opinions written in that term (114) and a slightly
smaller number of denials (948).' It might be noted that during the
past term, the Court granted certiorari in 92 cases on the appellate
docket and 7 on the miscellaneous dockets. At the term before, it
granted 149 and 18.
Presumably all the cases which the Court reviews are important.
There is no necessary converse presumption as to the cases which are
not reviewed, for although the importance of the issues involved may
be a ground for granting the petition, there are many reasons for denying the writ notwithstanding the presence of important public questions
in the case. The operation of certiorari jurisdiction is largely behind
a curtain. 9
How CERTIORARI OPERATES
'Since 1925, most of the work of the Supreme Court has been
within its discretionary jurisdiction."0 Appeals are important, but they
are vastly outnumbered by petitions for certiorari. Cases involving
original jurisdiction account for but a minute fraction of the Court's
work load. For a number of years the ratio of appeals to petitions for
certiorari was about 1 to 5 " and that proportion appears to hold
roughly for recent terms.
Congressional legislation in 1916 12 had brought some relief to
the Court from a burden which was becoming unmanageable. The
Federal Employers Liability Act had greatly increased the Court's business with a run of cases, many of which could hardly be thought of
sufficient importance to justify a claim on the time and energy of the
highest court in the land.' 3 The 1916 Act was intended in part to reduce the compulsory review by relieving the Court from the obligation
7. Law Week reported 437 cases on the miscellaneous -dockets in which certiorari
was denied but the clerk of the Supreme Court reports the figure used in the text.
8. See the REPORT OF THE DIRECToR OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE OF'ICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 71-73 (1949).
9. There is only a small literature on certiorari. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SuPaEm COURT, 255-298 (1927) ; Boskey, Mechanics of the
Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction, 46 COL. L. REV. 255 (1946) ; and notes in
15 A.B.A.J. 681 (1929) ; 15 CALIF. S.B.J. 257 (1940); 36 COL L. REv. 472 (1936);
4 GEo. W.L. REv. 257 (1935) ; 17 GEo. L.J. 307 (1929); 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. 252 (1930).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§1251-1257 (1946). See Boskey, supra note 9.
11. Ibid.
12. 39 STAT. 726 (1916), 28 U.S.C. §§338, 334 (1946), repealed, 62 STAT. 992
(1948).
13. H.R. REP. No. 794, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 6905 (1916). See FRANKFURTER
AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 9, at 206 et seq.
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of reviewing FELA cases which, in its judgment, presented unimportant issues. 4 The statute went far to accomplish this result.
But the flow of business soon again caught up with the Court's
capacity. In 1925, Congress at the urging of the Court "5vastly extended its power to control its business by shutting off numerous other
sources of appeal as of right, confining such review to three sources,
district courts, circuit courts of appeals and state courts. 6 The types
of cases from these courts were narrowly limited to the end that the
Court could so regulate its work as to pass primarily on questions of
widespread national significance.
This was the latitude which the Court desired." How is it working today? The present rule pertaining to certiorari provides:
"A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there
are. special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor measuring the Court's discretion, indicate
the character of reasons which will be considered:
"(a) Where a state court has decided a federal question of
substance not theretofore determined by this court, or has decided
it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions of this
court.
"(b) Where a circuit court of appeals has rendered a decision
in conflict with the decision of another circuit court of appeals or%
the same matter; or has decided an important question of local law
in a way probably in conflict with applicable local decisions; or has
decided an important question of federal law which has not been
but should be decided by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way probably in conflict with applicable decisions of this
court; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a
lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power of
supervision.
"(c) Where the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has decided a question of general importance, or
a question of substance relating to the construction or application
14. Id. at 213.
15. Chief Justice Taft was largely responsible for the 1925 legislation. A drafting
Committee consisting of Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland are
entitled to much of the technical credit. The measure was enacted primarily in deference to the prestige of Court sponsorship with critical examination only by Senator
Walsh in the Senate. The legislative history of the Act is traced in FRANKFURTER
AND LANDIS, op. cit. mtpra note 9, at 255-298.

16. Among others, the Court of Claims had gradually developed as a fruitful
source of work. Chief Justice Taft outlined the several sources of appeals, as of right,
from the circuit court of appeals. Hearings before Senate Subcommittee of the Colninittee on the Judiciary o S. 2060, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1924), quoted, in part, in
FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 262-265.
17. See Hearingsbefore the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 8206, 68th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1924), containing statements by Chief Justice Taft and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland in support of the bill; and see also Hearings, stipra
note 14.
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of the Constitution, or a treaty or statute, of the United States,

which has not been but should be, settled by this court; or where
that court has not given proper effect to an applicable decision of
this court." 8

In the application of this rule the Court has regularly followed the
so-called rule of four, i.e., if four justices so vote, the writ will be
granted."9 All certiorari cases on the appellate docket are examined by
each of the justices. Copies of the record and briefs are sent to all as
a matter of routine.2" Cases on the miscellaneous docket, it seems, are
sorted out in the office of the Chief Justice and those which appear to
have important issues, circulated among the justices. 2 Presumably
there are two reasons for this practice. In the first place by far the largest number of these are in forma pauperis with but one copy of the
record. In the second place, the Court's experience has indicated that
an overwhelming number of such cases have no merit at all.22 Votes
on all questions of grant or denial are taken at conference although the
result does not appear in the Court's report except in so far as a justice
"notes" his dissent which is done infrequently and presumably only
*when he feels strongly that the case should be reviewed.2 3 In the 1949
term, of the 1,033 cases summarily disposed of, dissents were noted in
only 25 cases, 20 of which were on the appellate docket.
In considering the work of the Court which involves full review,
it is noteworthy that there has been a steady decline in the number of
18. 28 U.S.C. Rule 38.5 (1946).
19. Mr. Justice Van Devanter in testifying before the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on the 1925 Act stated that the rule of four was already an established
practice in certiorari cases although it appeared that occasionally the writ had been
granted on a vote of three justices. Hearings before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee
on S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924) ; and see Bailey v. Central Vermont R. Co.,
319 U.S. 350, 358 (1943).
A curious rule is applied if, through disqualification of justices or otherwise the
Court cannot muster a quorum of six (28 U.S.C.A. § 1). It appears that if a majority
of the qualified justices vote that the case should not be heard at the next term of
court, the judgment of the court below is affirmed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2109 and see
Prichard v. United States, 339 U.S. 974 (1950).
20. Justice Stone, The Chief Justice, 27 A.B.A.J. 407 (1941).
21. See Chief Justice Stone, Functions of the Circuit Conferences, 28 A.B.A.J.
519 (1942).
22. "In 1946, a total of 528 [petitions in forina pauperis] were received. Most
of these petitions came from prisoners, state and federal, who challenged the legality
of their convictions or detention in post-trial proceedings. 455 such petitions were
filed last [1948] term. In addition, requests for other kinds of relief, such as original
writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, and the so-called common law writ
of certiorari, have mounted each year until they reached a peak of 249 last term....
Last term only 18 such cases, approximately 4% of the petitions were granted ....
This is not hard to account for, since most of the petitions are prepared by prisoners
without legal assistance and are without legal merit." Chief Justice Vinson, Work of
the Federal Courts, an address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949,
printed in 70 Sup. Ct. XIII, XV (1949).
23. "It becomes relevant here to note that failure to record a dissent from a denial
of a petition for writ of certiorari in no wise implies that only the member of the Court
who notes his dissent thought the petition should be granted." Justice Frankfurter in
Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
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cases disposed of by opinion since the 1925 Act. During the five terms
from 1926 to 1930, the Court rendered an average of 194 opinions per
term.2" For the five terms from 1932 to 1936, it wrote an average of
183 opinions per term.25 For the five terms from 1945 to 1949, the
average had dropped to 123, the low point being 94 for the past term. 2"
Now it is clear that the purpose of the 1925 Act was to make it possible
for the Court to regulate its business so that it can effectively discharge
its obligations. It is not at all clear, however, that Congress desired or
was willing to authorize the Court to reduce its work to the barest of
bare minima. If, as this article contends, there are cases which deserve
Supreme Court review but do not get it, it is a fair question whether
the Court may not be under an obligation to keep the volume of its output up to a reasonable standard. And although, as every one knows,
consideration of the record in certiorari cases makes enormous demands
upon the Court's time, obviously the task is greater if the Court grants
review and renders a full opinion.
THE PURPLE CURTAIN

In cases involving a denial of certiorari it is difficult to know what
goes on behind the purple curtain. We can probably assume that in a
large majority of the cases, none of the reasons set forth in Rule 38 was
present and this could account for the action taken. But no such inference can be safely drawn with respect to any particular case. The bar
has been repeatedly warned against assumptions based on a denial of
the writ.2 Although occasionally the Court 2 or one of the justices 29
24. This figure is based on the tables compiled by Frankfurter and Landis, The
Business of the Suprene Court, October Term, 1930, 45 HARV. L. REV. 271, 273 (1931).
25. Frankfurter and Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court, October Term,
1935, 1936, 51 HARv. L. Rev. 577, 581 (1937).
26. Data taken from Frank's articles for the 1947, '48 and '49 terms and from
U.S. LAT WEEK for the 1946 and '47terms.
27. "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the
merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times." Justice Holmes in United
States y. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
"Our rules adopted to carry out the policy of the statutes granting the power to
bring cases here by certiorari have apprised the Bar and the public that we will not
take cases fully heard and adjudicated below for the mere purpose of reexamining the
correctness of the result." Justice Roberts in Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 500
(1940). . . allthat a denial of a petition for certiorari means is that fewer than
four members of the Court thought itshould be granted . . ." Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for himself in State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918

(1950).
28. See Boskey, supra note 9, at 259-260 and cases cited. Occasionally, when the
reasons are given, a petition for rehearing may correct the defect, as where the defect
was jurisdictional. See, e.g., Brady v. Terminal R. Assoc., 302 U.S. 688 (1937). See
Boskey, Finality of State Court Judgments under the Judicial Code 43 COL. L. REV.
1002, 1005 et seq. (1943).
29. Justice Rutledge in a seven page opinion expressed his reasons for joining in
denial in Chase Nat'l Bank, Trustee v. Cheston, 332 U.S. 793, 794 (1947).
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will assign a reason for denial, the usual practice is merely a laconic
announcement of the result."0 Even justices who feel strongly enough
in opposition to note their dissent rarely state the grounds.3 '
During the past term Justice Frankfurter wrote a 13 page opinion
on the denial of a writ of certiorari to explain again that such action
could not be made the basis for a legitimate inference as to how the
justices felt about the merits of the case. The occasion for this admonition involved a volatile civil liberty issue arising out of the Baltimore
Radio Show case. 2 A radio station in Baltimore had been punished
for contempt of court by publication after a sensational broadcast of an
alleged confession by an accused charged with an especially revolting
murder of a little girl. The trial court held that the matters broadcast
constituted "not merely a clear and present danger to the administration
of justice, but an actual obstruction of the administration of justice, in
that they deprived the Defendant James of his Constitutional right to
have an impartial jury trial." " The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed on the ground that the power to punish for contempt is limited
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
It is clear that vital issues were at stake."4 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
himself said: "The issues considered by the Court of Appeals bear on
some of the basic problems of a democratic society. Freedom of the
press, properly conceived, is basic to our constitutional system. Safeguards for the fair administration of criminal justice are enshrined in
our Bill of Rights. Respect for both of these indispensable elements
of our constitutional system presents some of the most difficult and
30. "Since there are . . . conflicting and to the uninformed, even confusing
reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time
that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The time that would be required is prohibitive,
apart from the fact . . . that different reasons not infrequently move different
members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes

review undesirable." Justice Frankfurter in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338

U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
"To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Chief Justice Vinson, Work of the Federal
Courts, an address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, printed in
70 Sup. Ct. XIII, XIV (1949).
31. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented in six lines in Chase Nat'l Bank
v. Cheston, 332 U.S. 793 (1947).
32. Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 67 A.2d 497 (Md. 1949), cert. denied

338 U.S. 912 (1950).

33. From the statement by the trial court, quoted by Justice Frankfurter.

34. Note, 59 YALE L.J. 534 (1950).
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delicate problems

.

when they are before the Court for adjudi-

.

cation." "
And yet Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in the course of his opinion does
not tell us why the Court refused to review the case except that less than
four justices so voted. He sets forth in an appendix included in his
opinion a series of English authorities bearing on the problem, but we
have no express statement of his own attitude toward it. One is somehow struck with one of his own statements, made, of course, with respect to the problem in the Baltimore Radio Show Case: "One of the
demands of a democratic society is that the public should know what
goes on in court .

. to the end that the public may judge whether

our system of criminal justice is fair and right." "
There are many speculative reasons, aside from those suggested in
the Court's Rules, not all of which go to the merits,17 which might conceivably account for a denial. A case, for example, may result in a
denial because a petition has been granted in a case involving the same
question presented more clearly or more adequately or in conjunction
with other questions which the Court feels should also be considered.
Again, the Court, in determining whether the issue involved is of the
required importance, may, and indeed perhaps should in some instances,
consider whether the time is one for decision of the particular question.
In other words, the occasion may well be regarded as an appropriate
consideration in appraising the public importance of the issue presented.
For example, a period such as we are now experiencing, when many
congressmen, senators and other governmental officials are joining
citizens and private organizations in witch hunts which gravely imperil
civil liberties, may be thought to make doubly important issues of
freedom of speech, self-incrimination and contempt of court. On the
other hand, broad considerations of public interest and tolerance may
lead more than five members of the Court to believe that long-range
justice will be better served by delay in the determination of a particular
issue of national concern. "Pertinent considerations of judicial policy
here come into play. . .

ripening. 8

Wise adjudication has its own time for

During the past term, the Court reviewed several segre-

35. 338, U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
36. Ibid.
37. See, for example, cases denied because the petition departed from the requirement of brevity or clarity, Tiger v. Lozier, 275 U.S. 496 (1927); or because the
brief was inadequate, Zap v. United States, 326 U.S. 777 (1945) [but the Court subsequently changed its mind and its action and gave counsel a chance to try again.
326 U.S. 714 (1945)].
38. Justice Frankfurter on denial of certiorari in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950).
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gation cases of great importance."9 It will be interesting to observe the
grants and denials in other segregation cases during the next few terms.
And if the Court declines to consider such cases for some years, it may
be a plausible explanation that the Court, like litigants, has its strategy.
As another consideration which might be thought to influence
them, justices being what they are, the possible outcome of a review
should be mentioned. A justice or, for that matter, six of them, might
very properly vote for denial because persuaded that if the writ were
granted, five or more justices might decide the issue wrongly. It is
altogether understandable that a justice who has strong convictions
about a case of public importance might prefer to have the decision of
an inferior court stand rather than to have it authenticated in affirmance
by the highest Court. Thus, although dissatisfied with the result below,
he votes against review.
In some instances, however, it is almost impossible even to speculate as to the reasons for a denial of certiorari. A recent series of
cases serves as an excellent illustrative example.
In November 1949, the Supreme Court was asked to review the
40
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in Johnson v. Dye.
Johnson, an escaped Georgia convict apprehended in Pennsylvania,
brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a Pennsylvania state
court. He alleged inter alia that he had been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment while under confinement in Georgia. The writ
was discharged whereupon Johnson, before exhausting his state
remedies, brought another petition in the Pennsylvania federal courts.
The Third Circuit found his allegations to be correct and ordered his
release, stating that in an extradition case the prisoner need not follow
the usual requirement of exhausting state remedies before petitioning
for habeas corpus in a federal court. 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed in a one
sentence per curiam opinion ' which merely cited Ex parte Hawk.4"
The Hawk case involved the failure of a prisoner in a Nebraska penitentiary under sentence of a Nebraska court to exhaust his state
remedies before seeking habeas corpus in the federal system. The dis39. Sweatt v. Painter, 338 U.S. 865 (1950) (law school) ; McLauren v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 70 Sup. Ct. 851 (1950) (graduate school) (both unanimous decisions,
opinions by the Chief Justice) ; Henderson v. United States, 70 Sup. Ct. 843 (1950)
(railroad dining cars).
40. 175 F.2d 250 (1949).
41. Judge O'Connell dissented, stating that the prisoner should be required
to show that he would receive cruel and unusual punishment if returned to Georgia.
42. Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
43. 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
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tinction that the Third Circuit drew between extradition and nonextradition cases thus was ignored.
Later in the term, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed from
the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Ex parte Quillian44 to the
effect that the remedy of an escaped Georgia prisoner lay in the
Georgia and not the Ohio courts.45 The Supreme Court, perhaps feeling that Johnson v. Dye settled the issue, denied the writ.4" Justice
Douglas voiced the sole dissent.
In the meantime, however, two lower federal courts were wrestling
with the problem of the application of the Dye ruling to the issue presented in Ex parte Quillian. They both of necessity looked back to
the Hawk decision but came to different conclusions. The Second
Circuit 417 read Ex parte Hawk as applied to the Dye situation to mean

that the prisoner had to exhaust his remedies in the courts of the
state of apprehension before entering federal court. The District of
Columbia Circuit,48 on the other hand, felt that the Supreme Court
must have meant that Johnson had to pursue his remedy in Georgia
and not in Pennsylvania.49 Petitions for writs of certiorari were filed
from both decisions.
Reading Supreme Court Rule 38(5)b, set out supra, one might
think that no two cases could better come within its scope. An
ambiguous one sentence opinion of the Court had been interpreted in
diametrically opposed ways by federal courts of appeals. And the
problem involved was one which is continually confronting courts in
habeas corpus proceedings arising out of the apprehensior in another
44. 89 N.E.2d 493, appeal dismissed by the Ohio Supreme Court, 89 N.E2d 494
(1949).
45. The court relied upon Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, in which Mr. Justice
Holmes stated that the Constitution "peremptorily requires that upon proper demand
the person charged shall be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime." The Third Circuit decision in Johnson v. Dye, rendered a
month before, was not mentioned.
46. 339 U.S. 945 (1950).
47. United States ex rel. Jackson v. Ruthazer, 181 F.2d 588 (1950). Petitioner
had exhausted his remedies in the state courts of New York, where he had been
apprehended. On this basis, the Second Circuit held Johnson v. Dye 'distinguishable.
Had the court given the Dye ruling the alternative meaning, the two cases could
not have been so distinguished since neither Johnson or Jackson had instituted proceedings in Georgia.
48. Johnson v. Matthews, 182 F.2d 677 (1950).
49. Said Judge Prettyman: "If the Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Dye, mean
that the petitioner must exhaust his remedies in the Pennsylvania courts (where he
wvas being held for extradition only), it meant that those courts had jurisdiction to
entertain, and so to grant, his petition on the grounds he alleged. That would have
been a revolutionary reversal of all the cases on the subject, and we have serious
doubts that the Court intended to accomplish that result without argument and without opinion. Rather it seems more reasonable that the Court meant, by citing Ex
parte Hawk. to tell the petitioner to apply first to the state courts of Georgia which
had jurisdiction over the executive officials against whom he was complaining."
Id. at 683 n. 7. judge Bazelon dissented, following the Second Circuit interpretation.
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state of escaped convicts. ° But the Supreme Court apparently decided
to leave the issue in its present confused state. Certiorari was denied
52
in both cases. 5 To look for a reason is futile.
But it is not only the impossibility of learning why the Supreme
Court denies certiorari that takes knowledge of many of these cases beyond practical reach by the bar. The mystery is intensified by other
factors. In the first place, the cases on the miscellaneous docket are,
for the most part, almost impossible to identify much less examine without weeks of painstaking work at the Supreme Court building in
Washington. The Clerk does not even have a list of them compiled.
The published reports of the Court contain the docket numbers and the
names of the parties. There is no citation to the case below; in many
of them, there is not and never was a citation. In most, the jurisdiction involved is revealed only by such a circumstance as the name of
the respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding where the petitioner is a
prisoner and the respondent a well known warden. In cases wherd
there is a citation, it can usually be discovered only by a tedious examination in the dark of the many Tables of Cases in the various federal
and state jurisdictions which, of course, presents an enormous task
where 436 cases are involved.
Even the appellate docket sometimes presents problems which tend
to make the curtain difficult to penetrate. For the 1949 term, the
authors have been unable to find 37 cases which were reported in Law
Week as among those in which certiorari was denied; and in at least
18 others, no opinion was rendered in any court below. Since the Supreme Court rendered none, there is often no practical way of finding
out what officially was involved (although Law Week may give a brief
summary of the facts), to say nothing of obtaining facts on which to
base any kind of critical judgment.53
50. At least one district court has dealt with the question in 1950. Application
of Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950). The court specifically held, in
discharging the prisoner, that he need not seek his remedy in Georgia. Johnson v.
Dye was cited as authority.
51. Jackson v. Ruthazer, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 980, (1950); Johnson v.
Matthews, cert. denied, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 3098 (October 9, 1950).
52. Unquestionably the grounds for granting certiorari were stronger in the
Matthews case. The Ruthazer decision went against petitioner because he had had
a full and fair hearing in the New York courts. The petition for certiorari therefore
did not raise the jurisdictional issue as it might have had the prisoner been discharged on the merits and the respondent warden brought the petition. Regardless
of Jackson's ultimate fate, however, the Ruthazer interpretation of Johnson v. Dye
stands and should have been accepted or rejected. The Matthews case presented the
perfect opportunity. The District of Columbia Circuits' interpretation was squarely
presented as an issue and the Court was presumably aware of the contrary reasoning of the Second Circuit.
53. For example, the authors received the following letter from the Clerk of the
Supreme Court of California in response to an inquiry about the case of Taylor v.
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Notwithstanding the difficulties of a comprehensive survey of the
cases which the Supreme Court declined to consider on their merits, a
limited view can be obtained of the entire situation and a fairly extensive one of the cases which were placed on the appellate docket. Some
of the results are interesting and presumably have some significance
regardless of the silence with which the Court envelopes them.
GRIST OF THE CERTIORARI MILL

Of the 597 cases on the appellate docket in which petitions for certiorari were denied, the authors were unable to locate 37. This reduced
the number to 560. When the 78 companion cases are subtracted, there
are 482 left. Of these there was no opinion below filed in 18. This
leaves 464. An examination of the opinion of the inferior courts in
these cases showed 64 which the authors classified as presenting an
issue of national importance and thus such that a reasonable person
might suppose deserved review by the highest court in the land. One
or more justices dissented in 20 " cases. 55 In 78 cases there were dissenting opinions in the inferior courts, in 17 of which more than one
justice joined. Thirty-three cases were regarded as of sufficient importance to call for comments in law reviews up to June, 1950, some of
them in a half dozen different journals.
A word of explanation is necessary in connection with the choice
of cases characterized as "important." If the authors regarded a case
as presenting a close issue of national policy, it was included, notwithstanding a prior Supreme Court decision consistent with the position
of the lower court, particularly if the authors disagreed, on the merits,
with the precedent. Thus, cases are included in this group even though
they may not come, literally, within the wording of Rule 38. As a
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, in which the Supreme Court of the United States
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.
"Dear Mr. Harper:
"Our records disclose that the District Court of Appeal of the Second Appellate District on April 6, 1949, denied a petition for writ of certiorari and mandate
in the above proceeding, without opinion.
"This court on June 2, 1949, dtenied a hearing in the matter, without opinion.
Consequently, no opinion having been filed in either court, I am unable to furnish
you with the requested citation.
"Very truly yours,
(Signed) William I. Sullivan
Clerk of Supreme Court"
At this point the authors' labors ended so far as concerned Taylor v. Municipal Court
of Los Angeles.
54. Dissents were also noted in 5 cases placed on the miscellaneous dockets.
55. Justice Black dissented in all 20 cases. Justice Douglas who was absent for
most of the term dissented in 6, Justice Reed in 3, Justice Jackson in 1, and Justice
Burton in 1. In 2 cases there were 3 dissenting justices, in 7 cases, 2.

304

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

national policy-forming body of last resort, the function of the Court is
something more than merely matching case against precedent. As
every high school student knows, the Court throughout its historyincluding the not too remote history-has vacillated on controversial
issues of policy. In the authors' view, this is not necessarily undesirablo
even when the vacillation is the result of conflicting political pressures.
Accordingly, a question may be of sufficient "importance" to justify
Supreme Court review although decided by a lower court in precise
conformity with decisions of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, it is the thesis of this article that the influence of the
Supreme Court in our system of government cannot be accurately appraised by a consideration only of the cases which it reviews and decides
by written opinion. The cases which it declines to review and pass on
may be of equal or greater significance. And the fact that the latter are
so difficult to appraise, if not, indeed, to identify, may be thought to
make the matter even more important. In every case selected as "important," the question for the authors has not only been whether the
case came within the announced rule of the Court on certiorari but
whether it presented an issue of such importance to the nation as to
deserve consideration or reconsideration in these times.
The breakdown of the 64 "important" cases, according to the type
of question involved, discloses the largest group to raise questions of
civil rights other than those involved in problems of citizenship or
aliens. Of the 36 cases classified in this group, 22 were regarded as
"important." Of the 7 cases involving citizenship or rights of aliens 5
were also so classified. Thus, broad issues of civil liberties, the great
achievement of democratic society, were left unresolved in 27 out of the
43 cases in these two groups. Of 17 labor cases, 4 were thought by
the authors to be "important" while 5 of 9 cases involving conflict of
laws questions were so classified. Of the 127 cases classified as "miscellaneous," raising a variety of questions from interpretation of
treaties to questions under the Tucker Act, 10 were such that reasonable lawyers might regard the issues as important. On the other hand,
of 44 cases involving taxation only 4 were so regarded; 3 of 25 patent or
trade mark cases; 1 each of the 54 cases depending on diversity jurisdiction, 27 cases involving questions of federal jurisdiction and procedure, 31 cases involving questions of federal criminal law other than
civil rights, 19 bankruptcy cases, 18 admiralty cases and 7 anti-trust
cases. Of 6 cases involving veterans or military questions, 6 involving
the review of administrative proceedings and 8 involving rent control
or 0. P. A. questions, none was classified as "important."
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A "CLOSE-UP" OF SOME DENIALS
The authors, in selecting cases for comment, have designedly
picked those which in their judgment raise the most controversial problems of broad national interest. There is no inference at all that the
remaining cases classified as "important" are of equal significance although they were thought to be of sufficient interest to justify inclusion
in the "important" group. Since the largesf group of "important"
cases which the Court declined to review involved civil liberties, naturally the largest proportion to which special attention will be called is
from this group.
Take Lapides v. Clark 6 decided by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Judge Edgerton dissenting, commented on in
three law reviews."" A brief amicus was filed in the Court of Appeals
by the American Jewish Committee. Lapides and his wife, originally
Roumanian, had become naturalized in the United States and enjoyed
the advantages of American citizenship for 20 years. In 1934, the
Lapides with their son, a native born citizen, went to Palestine.
Lapides did not return to the United States until July 3, 1947, where
he spent the 4th of July on Ellis Island. Indeed, he is theoretically
there yet. Actually, he is at liberty under a bond and the Immigration
service has suspended proceedings for exclusion 5s because of a bill
pending in the Senate to legalize his entry. Presumably, since Knauff
v. United States 19 the Service may not proceed farther so long as such
a bill is pending. In the meantime, the Lapides boy, still a minor, has
returned to his native land to complete his education. The same statute 60 which excluded Lapides, of course, is also applicable to his wife
who, unable to obtain any kind of travel document, has got no closer
to the United States than Paris. 6 ' The unhappy Lapides are now a
56. 176 F,2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 861 (1949).
57. 63 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1950); 59 YAzx LJ. 139 (1950); 38 GEo. L.J. 137
(1950). For detailed discussion of the issues involved see Roche, Loss of American
Nationality, The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 25
(1950).
58. The Service had rejected Lapides' claim to a right to entry based on the evidence of his naturalization certificate, on the ground that he had been expatriated by
the operation of Section 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940 as amended (8 U.S.C.
§§ 804, 809) [1946], the pertinent part of which provides that: "A person who has
become a national by naturalization shall lose his nationality by: . . . (c) Residing
continuously for five years in any other foreign state, except as provided in Section

806 hereof." The exceptions are inapplicable to Lapides.
59. 181 F.2d 839 (2d Cir. 1950).
60. Supra note 58.
61. The State Department's policy of cooperation with the Justice Department
had led American consuls in Tel Aviv and Paris to refuse Mrs. Lapides a visitor's
visa because she would not be a bona fide visitor but presumably would, once here,
indulge in the same strategy as her husband if Senator Gillette continued to be cooperative.
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broken family, with the Lapides son in the position where he is forced
to make the miserable choice of giving up his country or his mother.
The legal question raised by Lapides v. Clark was the constitutionality of Section 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940. Lapides contended
that Congress could not confer citizenship with a condition subsequent
attached 62 and thus create a citizenship, second class; that the discrimination between naturalized citizenship and natural born citizenship is
unconstitutional. Indeed, the "condition subsequent" was in the nature
of a retroactive one in this case, since Section 404 was enacted long
after the Lapides had been naturalized and even after they had left the
country. The Act of 1907 6 had been interpreted as providing only for
who had lived
loss of diplomatic protection by a naturalized citizen
4
origin.
his
of
not
country
a
in
years,
5
abroad for
The American Jewish Committee in its brief stressed the point that
the statute was sufficiently broad to include both voluntary and involuntary residence abroad and the fact that one type of involuntary residence, ill health, 5 was excepted from the sweeping language of Section
404 supports this construction. It further pointed out that the only case
in which the Supreme Court has upheld a conclusive presumption of
expatriation involved what was clearly a voluntary act-marriage by a
female national to an alien.6 6 The government contended that Lapides'
residence abroad was voluntary but he was never given an opportunity
to show the contrary since the trial court dismissed his petition.
Judge Edgerton based his dissent on the broad ground that discrimination between naturalized and other citizens is unconstitutional.
"A 'rule of naturalization,' " he said, "regulates eligibility and procedure for becoming a citizen. It increases the number of citizens, but
does not divide them into classes. By authorizing Congress to prescribe who may become naturalized and how, the Constitution does not
authorize it to deprive citizens either at or after naturalization of
liberties that other citizens enjoy." 67
62. "American citizenship is not a right granted on a condition subsequent...
Justice Murphy concurring in Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 679 (1944).
63. 34 STAT. 1228 (1907).

64. 28 Op. ATr'y GaEi. 504, and see United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353 (1924);
Nurge v. Miller, 286 Fed. 982 (1923).
Before the 1940 amendment to the Nationality Act, a Cabinet Committee of Advisors rejected a more severe rule for naturalized citizens residing abroad for more
than 5 years ina country not of origin, but recommended automatic expatriation ifthe
residence was inthe country of origin. See Hearings before Cmnmittee on Immigration, and Naturalization on H.R. 6127 superseded by H.R. 9980, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
493, 495 (1932). The reason for the distinction isfairly obvious and isexplained
therein by the Committee.
65. Section 406, 54 STAT. 1170 (1940), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 806 (1946).
66. MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
67. 176 F.2d 619, 622 (1949).
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It is obvious that the question raised in the Lapides case is an
important one. Loss of citizenship is a terrible penalty. Justice Rutledge in Klapprott v. United States," said in a concurring opinion:
"To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to our
law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power. U. S.
Const. Amend. VIII. Yet by the devise or label of a civil suit,
carried forward with none of the safeguards of criminal procedure
provided by the Bill of Rights, this most comprehensive and basic
right of all, so it has been held, can be taken away and in its wake
may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment."
If it is to be done, such punishment should be imposed only after a
full hearing and trial of all the important facts. Lapides not only failed
to get his day in the Supreme Court, but, on at least one of the vital
factual issues, it seems that he got no day in court at all.
Although Lapides' case involved only the grief of one man's
family, troubles of this nature are not confined to these three people. Under the operation of Section 404, a substantial number of
Americans have lost their citizenship.69 Why did the Supreme Court
decline to review a question of such broad national interest? We are
told that it is useless even to speculate.7"
In Trumbo v. United States and Lawson v. United States 71 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed convictions for
contempt of the Committee on Un-American Activities of the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and thus sealed
the fate of the "Hollywood Ten." Defendants had refused to say
whether they were or ever had been members of the Communist Party,
contending that the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
68. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
69. Involuntary Loss of American Citizenship, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EXPATRIATIONS NATIONAL COUNCIL ON NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP 16

(1947).

70. Other cases in which the Court leclined to review problems involving deportation or citizenship are United States v. Eichenlaub, 180 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1028 (1950) ; People ex rel. Choolokian v. Mission of The Immaculate Virgin, 300 N.Y. 437, 88 N.E.2d 302 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 912 (1950) ;
Schoeps v. Carmichael, 177 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950) ;
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.949 (1950), as
to which, see 38 GEo. L.J. 327 (1949).
On a previous petition, the Court had granted certiorari in another Eichenlaub
litigation and affirmed a lower court decision that petitioner could be deported under
a statute which made the commission of certain crimes by an alien a deportable ground,
although petitioner, since denaturalized, was a naturalized citizen at the time of the
offense. United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950),
Justices Frankfurter, Black and Jackson dissenting. See the comment on this case by
Frank, The United States Supreme Court, 1949-1950, 18 U. OF CHI. LAW REv. 1, 23
(1950).
71. 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 434 (1950).
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States, guaranteeing Freedom of Speech, also guaranteed them freedom
of silence. They further contended that the question had no legitimate
relation to any Constitutional function of Congress and thus was in
excess of the Committee's authority. The Court of Appeals held that
the Committee was properly constituted and that the investigation of
communist infiltration in the moving picture industry was a proper
subject for Congressional inquiry. When legislating to arrest what it
believes to be a threat to the national security or welfare, Congress may
abridge either the right to remain silent or the right of free speech and
may require an individual to make a statement believed necessary to
arrest an anticipated evil. It can hardly be doubted that the issues
raised are important in a free country. Dissents were "noted" by
Justices Black and Douglas. It is an easy guess as to how Justices
Murphy and Rutledge would have voted.
In Marshall v. United States,7" the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the conviction of the chairman of the "National Federation for Constitutional Liberties" for contempt of the
same House Committee when he refused to produce records and documents pursuant to a Committee subpoena. Prior to trial, defendant
moved to dismiss on the grounds that the resolution creating the Committee was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the constitutionality of the Committee had been established by the decision in
Barsky v. United States,7" in which the Supreme Court denied certiorary at the 1947 term. 4 Only Justice Black avowed his dissent to the
denial of certiorari in Marshall's case.
Citations for contempt of Congressional Committees may raise
further problems for the Court. The "Hollywood Ten" and other
cases raised the questions whether the House Committee on Un-American Activities is a "constitutional" committee and whether the First
Amendment protects "freedom of silence." The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has now affirmed Judge Medina's decision that the
ten Communist leaders are guilty of violation of the Smith Act "' which
makes criminal, conspiracies to advocate or advocacy of the overthrow
of the government by force. Under the decision, membership in the
Communist Party may be a crime.7" The Supreme Court will have the
72. 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 434 (1950).
73. 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
74. 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
75. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950).
76. It seems clear from Judge Hand's opinion that simply because the validity of
the Smith Act was upheld in this case the court does not hold that membership in the

Communist Party is necessarily unlawful at all times under any and all circumstances
under the Act. The Court held "the Smith Act to be constitutional, as the judge
construed it; and that evidence supported the verdict of the jury."

(2d Cir. 1950).

183 F.2d 201, 215
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task of determining whether it will review the holding of the Second
Circuit on the constitutionality of the Smith Act and the legality of
the convictions thereunder. If it declines to review, or if, reviewing,
it affirms, it may then have the problem whether it will review contempt convictions of witnesses who refuse to answer the "are you now
or have you ever been" question on the grounds of self-incrimination."'
The issue is "important." 78
The work which the Court did in respect to the Nation's Number One civil rights problem, segregation, should be considered in
relation to the work it refused to do in connection with the same problem. The Court wound up the term in a blaze of democratic glory
with unanimous decisions written by the Chief Justice."9 But this is
only a part of the story. At least two important aspects of the segregation issue were avoided.
77. In Doran v. United States, 181 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1950), a civil contempt
proceeding, the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit by a 4-3 vote held that witnesses
before a federal grand jury could refuse to answer questions about the organization
and membership of the communist party on the ground that the answers would incriminate them. The court held similarly in Alexander v. United States, 181 F.2d
480 (9th Cir. 1950).
However, in Rogers v. United States and Blau v. United States, 180 F.2d 103
(10th Cir. 1950), a Federal grand jury investigation of loyalty of employees of the
government, Rogers and Blau refused to answer any questions showing membership
in, connection with or knowledge of activities of the Communist Party on the grounds
that it would incriminate them in light of the indictment and trial of the party leaders
in New York for violation of the Smith Act. Rogers and Blau then were brought
before the district judge, Blau without, Rogers with a formal presentment. They still
refused to answer. They were found guilty of contempt and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit which stated that membership in
the Communist Party was not [yet] a criminal offense. In the Blau case, certiorari
was granted, 70 Sup. Ct. 979 (1950). In the Rogers case it was denied, 70 Sup. Ct.
999 (1950). No difference is suggested between these cases and the case of the
similar question raised by refusal to testify before a Congressional committee. The
respective spouses of the above mentioned litigants had previously gone through the
same contempt proceedings, 179 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both cases. 70 Sup. Ct. 978 (1950).
78. The Court during the past term, refused to review United States v. Rosen,
174 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949), in which the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit hafd reversed a conviction for contempt when the
accused had declined to answer questions before a grand jury pertaining to the ownership of a Ford car which Alger Hiss had claimed he gave to Whittaker Chambers.
Grounds for refusal were self-incrimination. But it also declined to review Kamp v.
United States, 176 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 977 (1950),
in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed a conviction of
"willfully making default" in violation of an Act of Congress (2 U.S.C. § 192) when
defendant had failed to produce records before a Congressional Committee after he
had been served with a document described in the indictment as a subpoena, directing
the Sergeant at Arms to summon lefendant to testify and commanding the officer
rather than the witness to produce the records (Constitutional Education League,
Inc.). The trial court overruled a demurrer to the indictment and excluded testimony
offered by the accused to show lack of willful intent to make default.
United States v. Green, 176 F.2d 169 (1949), United States v. Winston, and
United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163 (1949), all in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed contempt convictions by Judge Medina growing out of the famous
"Communist Trial" in Foley Square. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in all
three cases, 338 U.S. 851 (1950), Justice Black alone "noting" his dissent.
79. See cases cited in note 39 supra.
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In the Stuyvesant Town case,"0 the Court declined to review the
issue of segregation in housing. A Negro war veteran brought an action to enjoin a private corporation 8"from denying him an apartment
on account of his color. The corporation was the beneficiary of public
funds in the sense that it received tax exemption privileges in accordance with a plan approved by the city planning commission and the
board of estimates of the City of New York. The plaintiff lost in the
New York Court of Appeals by a 4 to 3 decision. 2 Justices Black and
Douglas "noted" dissents to the denial of certiorari. The case was
"important" by anybody's standard.
Probably nobody would deny that Negroes like to play tennis.
And if they want to play tennis with white friends on public courts, it
is at least a fair question whether they should have such privileges in
a democratic country. But they can't have them in Maryland.8 3 And
the Supreme Court declined, for some reason or other, to face this
issue.
When one stops to consider the number of American citizens
whose lives are profoundly affected by segregation in education at the
80. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512 (1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup.
Ct. 1019 (1950) commented on in 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 247 (1949); 35 CORNELL L.Q.
399 (1949) ; 35 VA. L. REv. 917 (1949) ; 38 GEo. L.J. 309 (1950); 25 No=E DAME
LAW 146 (1950) ; 16 BROOKLYN L. Rv. 110 (1950) ; 23 TEMPLE L. Rsv. 209 (1949);
4 MiAMI L. REv. 102 (1950).
81. Stuyvesant Town is a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. and was
organized under the New York Redevelopment Law as a $90,000,000 corporation
which bought 18 city blocks after the City of New York had condemned the property.
The Town converted the area into an 8400 apartment low rental housing project.
82. The court declined to follow the growing authority that private organizations
whose functions are surcharged with high voltage public interest because they affect
interests of large numbers of people (see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1945).
The condemnation proceedings unhoused some 3000 families. Carson, Urban Redevelopmient Legislation, American City, Nov. 1946, p. 93. Of course, the decision will
affect thousands more in similar areas) and whose efforts are assisted or encouraged
by state action, may not discriminate on account of race or color when the states
themselves are forbidden by the Constitution to do so. See Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (discrimination by labor union having statutory
bargaining powers) ; Smith v. Alwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (racial discrimination
by "private" political party) ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) (prohibition
of distribution of religious literature on streets of "privately owned" town). See comments, 98 U. OF PA. L. REv. 247 (1949) ; 35 CORNELL L.Q. 399 (1950).
83. Winkler v. State, 69 A.2d 674 (1949) (a 5 to 1 decision), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 919 (1950). The Baltimore Park Board had a policy of segregation on the
municipal tennis courts. Winkler and others, desiring to test this policy, obtained a
permit and started an interracial game of tennis. Leaflets had been distributed and
a good sized crowd was in attendance. The police requested the game be discontinued
and when it wasn't arrests were made accompanied by some disorder, though everything had been previously peaceful. Winkler and his companions were arrested for
violating the rules of the Board and for conspiring to disturb the peace and were
brought to trial on the latter charge. Their conviction was affirmed by the Maryland
Court of Appeals over the vigorous dissent of one of its members who felt the defendants were convicted of exercising their constitutional rights of freedom of speech and
freedom to play interracial tennis on a public court upon compliance with all formal
requirements, in the absence of any valid segregation law, rule or regulation. Cf. Taylor v. City of Birmingham, 45 So. 2d 53 (C. A. Ala. 1950), cert. denied, 19 U.S.L.
WEEK 3097 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1950).
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graduate and professional level on the one hand, and in housing and
recreation on the other,84 he gets a perspective on the work which the
Supreme Court did and the work which it didn't do during the past
term.
The Court denied certiorari in a number of other cases involving
assorted questions of civil rights, some no doubt decided in a manner
which could be regarded as consistent with prior decisions of the Court
and some which can hardly escape appraisal as an extension or contraction of such decisions. Still others gave the Court an opportunity, if
it had wanted one, to review past decisions, re-evaluate the policies involved and resettle or unsettle important issues.
A Connecticut case " involved conviction of murder after accused
had been confined for 7 days in the State Police barracks on a coroner's
warrant. The trial court found that accused's confession after such
confinement was admissible since it had not been obtained by physical
violence. The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed, holding that a
confession thus "voluntarily" made was admissible and would not become otherwise because made during an illegal detention unless the
detention is shown to be causally connected with the confession.
In an Illinois case, 6 an action had been instituted to review orders
of a municipal civil service commission discharging two policemen because they had refused to sign immunity waivers in advance of testifying before a grand jury concerning matters pertaining to their occupation. The Appellate Court affirmed the Commission's orders on the
ground that a police officer by reason of his special status, duties and
responsibilities may not invoke the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination in matters touching upon his occupation without being
guilty of a breach of duty by refusal to testify.
In State v. Nagel8 7 there had been a conviction for contributing to
the delinquency of a minor, the daughter of the county judge before
whom the accused was arraigned. After setting bail, excusing jurors
and ordering additional jurors to be summoned, the judge disqualified
himself and testified as a witness for the prosecution. The judge had
been the complaining witness. The trial court denied defendant's
motion for a change of venue. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed.
84. It is recognized that Negroes suffer from inadequate housing more than any
See CLARiK AND PERLMAN, PREJUDICE AND
PROPERTY, 12 et seq. (1948).

other racial group in the United States.

83. State v. Buteau, 68 A.2d 681 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903 (1950).
86. Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33, 54 (1949) (two cases), cert. denied, 70
Sup. Ct. 1027 (1950).
87. 185 Ore. 486, 202 P.2d 640, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 818 (1949).
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In a Michigan case,8" the Supreme Court of that State, without
opinion, denied an application for leave to appeal the conviction for
indecent exposure of a member of a nudist group who had been arrested
without a warrant by an officer who, without permission, entered private
grounds which had been rented by the "club" for sunbathing.
Four cases 89 involved conviction for violations of provisions of
the Selective Service Act based on religious grounds. Three of the
four concerned refused to register or submit to induction. The fourth 0
involved Section 12a of the Act making it an offense knowingly to
counsel another to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed
forces. The defendant counseled his stepson to refuse to register
insofar as the boy's objections were based on religious grounds. For
this he was convicted, even though the boy had in fact rejected the
counsel.
Two cases involved restrictions imposed by professional societies
on persons who have met statutory qualifications for the practice of
their profession. In an Indiana case, 9 a physician had been excluded
from the use of a hospital under a rule requiring practitioners in the
hospital to be members of the active resident staff which in turn was
conditioned on membership in the county medical society. An additional
rule required a surgeon practising in the hospital who was not a member
of the staff to have served as an intern for one year in an approved hospital or to have had three years of surgical training. The Indiana Court
held that the hospital might not require practitioners, as a prerequisite
for the use of its facilities, to become members of its resident staff
inasmuch as this amounted to a preference in favor of members of the
medical society and a discrimination against those physicians who, by
choice or otherwise, are not members of it. It upheld, however, the
rule affecting surgeons.
In a Pennsylvania case,92 a lawyer challenged the constitutionality
of a local rule of court requiring attorneys desiring to practice in
Montgomery county to declare that they would open and maintain
their principal office in that county. This rule, the purpose of which
88. People v. Church, 18 U.S. LAW WEFK 3201 (Mich. 1949), cert. denied, 70
Sup. Ct. 997 (1950).
89. United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct.
997 (1950) ; United States v. Wixom (C.A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 1030
(1950), in which no opinion was rendered, the court deciding the case on the authority
of the Henderson case; United States v. Mansavage, 178 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 931 (1950) ; Warren v. United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950).
90. Warren v. United States, =rpra note 89.
91. Hamilton County Hospital v. Andrews, 84 N.E.2d 469, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
831 (1949).
92. Christy v. Conover, 362 Pa. 347, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 869 (1949).
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is pretty obvious, was upheld as a "reasonable" exercise of the power
of government.
Two cases in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari petitions
involved political processes,93 another the right to attend a tax supported educational institution, 4 and still another the privilege of public
officers.95 The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a conviction for violation of a statute forbidding the distribution of any sample ballot other
than those ordered for use in the election, for the purpose of instructing
voters how to vote. The defendant had spoken at a political meeting
at which prohibited ballots had been distributed and at which he advised
those present how to vote and for whom to vote.9" The Georgia
Supreme Court9 7 affirmed a decision upholding a statute setting up a
new registration system under which all persons, as prerequisite to
voting in state and federal elections, must be able to read intelligently
and write legibly selected portions of the state or federal constitution,
or must appear before before the Board of Registrars and "correctly"
answer 10 out of 30 questions propounded by the Board dealing with
civics and government.9" The Supreme Court of Michigan refused to
require a State College to reinstate a student who was expelled because, as a member of an unrecognized student organization, he had
arranged an off-campus meeting at which an indicted member of the
Communist party spoke.9" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that an action for false imprisonment would not lie against the
Attorney General, the Director of the Enemy Alien Control unit of the
Department of Justice and the District Director of Immigration at Ellis
Island, even though they acted maliciously so long as they purported to
act in the line of duty, 100 a decision pushing the absolute privilege of
members of the bureaucracy exercising quasi-judicial powers about as
far as it can be pushed.'
93. Branton v. State, 214 Ark. 861, 218 S.W.2d 698, cert. detiled, 338 U.S. 869
(1949) ; Franklin v. Harper, 55 S.E.2d 221 (Ga. 1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 804

(1950).

94. Zarichny v. State Board of Agriculture, 18 U.S. LAW WEEK 3014 (Mich.
1949), cert. denied, 70 Sup. Ct. 56 (1949).
95. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), noted in 38 GEo. L. REv. 327
(1950).
96. Branton v. Arkansas, .supra note 93.
97. Franklin v. Harper, supra note 93.
98. Two of the questions: who is the Chief Justice of the Georgia Supreme
Court?; who succeeds the President if he dies in office? The contention was made
that 1,200,000 persons were disenfranchised by the operation of this system.
99. Zarichny v. State Board of Agriculture, sufra note 94.
100. Gregoire v. Biddle, supra note 95.
101. The absolute privilege applies to judges of courts of record (Bradley v. Fisher,
13 Wall. 335 (1871)) and, by some cases, to petty judicial tribunals. Cooke v. Bangs,
31 Fed. 640 (1887). It has been applied to protect high executive officers in policy
forming positions (Spaulding v. Villas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895) (Postmaster General) ;
Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (Secretary of the Interior), and to some
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The past term denials also included a group of Conflict of Laws
cases some of which presented knotty problems under the Constitution
and laws of the United States. The Missouri Supreme Court had held
that the question whether a petitioner was entitled to a decree of
equitable adoption in order to establish her claim to Iowa assets of an
alleged adoptive relative should be determined under the laws of
Missouri where a contract to adopt was entered into and which was
presumably the domicile of the parties thereto. It further had held that
the petitioner was not the adopted child of her deceased uncle since the
statutory conditions to the status of adoption had not been met, thus
denying the petitioner's prayer for relief. It had been contended that
full faith and credit to the law of Iowa on the issue of equitable adoption
was required in so far as it concerned the descent and distribution of
Iowa property including both land and personalty.'
No obvious constitutional issue leaps to the eye although the case suggests complicated
problems of qualification which conceivably might affect the determination of the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit clause. There
may be further questions as to the effect of the decree on the petitioner's
rights in Iowa although such questions are not raised by the case itself.
Moloney v. Moloney 103 presented another of those distressing
domestic tangles in which the children are the pawns of conflict between
spouses and turn out to be the chief victims of a broken family. A
father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Kansas to obtain
custody of his minor children under a 34 day old Missouri decree
awarding him custody. By a 5 to 2 decision the Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed a decree denying the writ and awarding custody to thae mother
on the ground of "changed conditions" brought about during the period
intervening between the two decrees. Because the Supreme Court,
in its last sally at this delicate problem,' left so many questions unanswered, it is perhaps understandable that it chose not to review the
case. Perhaps there are no satisfactory solutions to such problems.
Other domestic issues were avoided by the denials in Walsh v.
Walsh 105and United States Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Bartgos,10 6 another
5 to 2 decision in the State court. In the Walsh case, plaintiff had
sought to have vacated a decree of divorce rendered in Louisiana in
lower executive or administrative officials. Brown v. Rudolph, 25 F.2d 540 (D.C.
Cir. 1928) (commissioners of the District of Columbia). In Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S.
503 (1927) the Supreme Court held that the absolute immunity protected a special
assistant to the Attorney General. By the Gregoirecase, it now goes down the hierarchy to include the District Director of Immigration at Ellis Island.
102. Menees v. Cowgill, 223 S.W.2d 412, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1949).
103. 167 Kans. 444, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 903 (1949).
104. People of State of New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
105. 215 La. 1099, 42 So. 2d 860 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
106. 210 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1949), cert denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950).
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1944 by her husband, since deceased. The decree had been granted on
allegations that the parties had been separated for more than two years
and that the husband had established his residence in Louisiana after
being transferred to a military base there in 1932. The "widow,"
resident of the District of Columbia, alleged that she had not received
notice of the divorce proceedings, that the Louisiana court had no
jurisdiction since her husband had not acquired a Louisiana domicile.
On the basis of conflicting evidence the trial court vacated the divorce
decree, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that
the decree was presumptively valid and that the plaintiff had the burden
of showing its invalidity. The court ignored the questions under McDoild v. Maybee' 0 7 raised by plaintiff's contention that the Louisiana
statute providing for notice by publication but with no provision for
registered or other mailing or any other substitute for publication was
invalid under the due process clause. Whether the "widow" would
have fared better on appeal we will never know.
The intra-family quarrel involved in the Bartgos 0 case had led
to an action in a Colorado court to recover damages from plaintiff's
former husband for alleged fraud in inducing her to enter into a property settlement referred to and approved by a Kansas decree granting
the wife a divorce. The agreement, however, was not set forth or
included in the decree.
In several of the cases discussed above, the decision to deny the
petition for certiorari was made by less than all the justices. Another
case involving a dissent will be discussed below. The rest of the cases
in which dissents were "noted" by one or more of the justices to the
certiorari denial involved questions of federal taxation,"0 9 , labor," 0 mo107. 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
108. 210 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1949).
109. Cobb v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 173 F.2d 711 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 832 (1949), Justices Black and Jackson dissenting. Cobb had given
income producing realty to his daughters to assist them in early married life and to
reduce his income taxes. Subsequently he was notified of a gift tax deficiency and
employed an attorney to petition for reduction of the deficiency. Cobb then tried to
deduct the attorney's fees as "ordinary and necessary expenses" within §23(a) 2 of
the Internal Revenue Code on grounds that they were paid for the production of income
and for the management, conservation and maintenance of property held for the production of income since income producing securities were sold at loss to pay the
deficiency.
The Court of Appeals held that the attorney's fees were not deductible within
meaning of § 23a (2) since the giving away of property does not produce income to
donor or constitute either management or conservation of property and the expense
of attorneys' fees was in proximate relation to the gifts and not the production of
income or the management of property. The court found the argument that the gift
was to reduce taxes and increase family property specious since Cobb and his daughters were not a taxable unit.
110. International Union, U.M.W., v. United States, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949) (Justices Black, Reed and Douglas dissenting).
The United States brought contempt proceedings against John L. Lewis and the
United Mine Workers for disobeying a temporary restraining order enjoining the
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nopoly,"' infringement, 1 2 eminent domain,"'

jury trial,1 1 4 self-in-

continuation of the 1948 strike in the bituminous coal industry. At trial, the government introduced evidence to the effect that the walkout had been concerted and under
the control of Lewis and that the union had not exercised whatever powers it had
at its disposal to get its members back to work. The defendants contended that there
had been no "strike" and therefore they were not liable for any work stoppages. The
district court found for the government and the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, in 177 F.2d 29 (1949), affirmed the judgment and the fines of $1,400,000
and $20,000 levied on the UMW and Lewis respectively.
State v. Casselman, 69 Idaho 237, 205 P.2d 1131, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 900 (1949)
(Justices Black, Reed and Burton dissenting). Employees of Western Electric were
indicted and convicted for violating the Idaho Secondary Boycott Act, which outlaws
secondary boycotts in "labor disputes" but fails to define the term "labor dispute."
The defendants diuring labor difficulties between them and Western Electric had
picketed the building of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. with
banners which did not indicate against whom they were picketing. As a result, the
employees of the Mountain States stopped work. Western Electric, which is located
in the same building, provides the equipment for Mountain States' operation and both
are subsidiaries of American Telephone and Telegraph, although they negotiate with
the labor unions representing their employees on an individual basis. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding the statute sufficiently definite to
meet constitutional objections since it was in pari nateria with the state civil injunction statute enacted the same day which defined "labor dispute." The court also refused to "pierce the corporate veil" and found that the picketing in fact constituted
a secondary boycott.
Carroll v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 493, 54 S.E.2d 221 (1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 937 (1950) (Justice Black dissenting). The issue presented in this and six
companion cases which the Supreme Court was asked to consider on certiorari was
whether a conviction for contempt for violating a labor injuction against mass picketing Decame moot when the labor dispute was settled.
111. Turner Glass Corp. v. Hartford Empire Co., 173 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 830 (1949) (Justice Black dissenting). Hartford Empire was found
guilty of violating the antitrust laws by engaging in conspiracy, combination and
monopoly in obtaining and licensing patents in glass making machinery and in limiting
and restricting the use of the machinery. On the basis of this conviction, Turner
brought a triple damage action for $7,000,000, claiming that the restrictive licensing
policy of Hartford under their patents and royalties and the license fees paid by Turner
to Hartford during period of the conspiracy placed Turner at a competitive disadvantage which directly caused injury and damage to Turner's business and property in
violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The trial court found that the
evidence failed to establish that defendant caused any damage to plaintiff's business
and/or property. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that
in order to recover damages for violations of the Sherman Act under Section 7, Turner
had to show that it was injured and the sole fact that Hartford had been adjudged
guilty in another case was of no help to Turner in the absence of proof, lacking in this
instance, that it sustained personal pecuniary damage.
The court stated further that the license agreements under which Turner received
rights to use leased machinery were not inherently illegal since they did not necessarily
involve doing anything illegal. The fact that Hartford was found guilty of violating
the Sherman Act for entering into illegal cross licensing agreements did not affect
the enforceability of these agreements.
A comment in 63 HARv. L. REv. 907 (1950) points out the difficulty of meeting
the rigid requirements of proof in civil actions under the Sherman and Clayton Acts
where potential liability is extensive as compared to the relatively trivial liability in
criminal actions against offending corporations. As to the results of civil actions, see
Lockhart, 31 MIxN. L. Rxv. 507, 571 (1947).
112. Ric-Wil v. Kaiser Co., 179 F.2d 401 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 958
(1950) (Justice Black dissenting.) Ric-Wil sued Kaiser for infringing its patents
covering a conduit system and its improvements adopted for use in the transmission
of steam and other liquids. The trial court found for Ric-Wil and the Court of Appeals, after modifying the judgment in so far as it directed an accounting by Kaiser,
affirmed.
Charles Peckat Mfg. Co. v. Jacobs, 178 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 915 (1950) (Justice Black dissenting). Peckat sued Jacobs for infringement
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crimination and right to counsel, n

5

extradition," 6 interstate com-

of a patent covering an outside sun visor for automobile windshields. The trial court
found that Peckat's patent had been anticipated by a prior patent and prior uses. The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the patent valid and infringed.
113. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 852 (Ct. Cl. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950) (Justices Black and Reed dissenting). The United
States constructed a navigation dam on the Mississippi River which raised the water
level above the ordinary high water mark. As a result, wooden trestle bridges across
sloughs adjacent to the main channel were so weakened as to become inadequate to
withstand even normal flood conditions and had to be rebuilt. The sloughs themselves
were not improved or maintained by the United States for commercial navigation.
The Court of Claims awarded Iowa-Wisconsin, the owner of the bridges, damages on
the theory that although the dam was constructed to improve navigation, the sloughs
traversed by the bridges are not navigable watercourses of the United States. The
government had taken the position that the trestle bridges were over navigable waters
and therefore any damage to them resulting from navigation improvements was not
compensible.
114. State v. Bridges, 231 N.C. 163, 56 S.E.2d 397 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
939 (1950) (Justice Douglas, dissenting). Bridges was indicted for murder in the
first degree and entered a formal plea of not guilty. At trial his defense was conducted on the theory that a second degree verdict would satisfy the ends of justice and
he indicated in response to a question by the trial judge that he was not contending he
should be acquitted. In charging the jury, the judge spoke of the "cloak of innocence"
surrounding the defendant but at the end put to the jury the choice of first or second
degree murder. Bridges was convicted of the former and sentenced to death. The
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed over a bitter dissent by one judge who felt
the whole issue of guilt or innocence should have been left to the jury.
Flowers v. Mississippi, 41 So.2d 352 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 946 (1950)
(Justices Black and Douglas dissenting). The dtefendant, a Negro, was indicted and
convicted on a charge of having shot one of a group of white men who had come to
his home to warn him to leave the community. On appeal he contended unsuccessfully
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights because no Negro's names were listed
in the grand jury box and only one Negro was empanelled for the petit jury.
115. People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 208, 90 N.E.2d 40 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
916 (1950) (Justice Black dissenting). Perez was arrested, held for 24 hours and
then brought before a judge and committed as a material witness in connection with a
murder. After five days of consistent questioning without an attorney being present
on his behalf he confessed to committing the crime. After being convicted Perez
challenged the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury that they might consider
the delay in arraignment in determining whether the confession was voluntary or not.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction holding inter alia that the
five day commitment as a material witness was valid since Perez had admitted knowledge of circumstances surrounding the murder.
Moore v. Mississippi, 207 Miss. 140, 41 So.2d 368, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 844
(1949) (Justice Black dissenting). Moore was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. On appeal he contended that his confession was made under duress in the
absence of attorney or family and that he had not been brought before a committing
magistrate promptly. In affirming his conviction, the Mississippi Supreme Court held
Moore had voluntarily confessed and that even if there had been a delay in his arraignment, it was immaterial insofar as the admissibility of the confession was concerned.
Miller v. State, 207 Miss. 156, 41 So.2d 375, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 844 (1949)
(Justice Black dissenting). This was a prosecution for burglary of an uneducated
Negro of subnormal intelligence. On appeal after conviction, Miller claimed that a
confession he had made was involuntary, that he had been held incommunicado, that
he had no lawyer when arraigned and that the court failed to appoint one. The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that his confession was not involuntary and that
since the defendant did not request an attorney he waived his right to have one appointed.
116. Ex parte Quillian, 152 Ohio St. 368, 89 N.E.2d 493 (1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 945 (1950) (Justice Douglas dissenting). See text at note 44, mcpra.
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merce," 7 and the powers of a Four Power military tribunal."' Five of
these were on the miscellaneous docket." 9 All appear to present important questions although whether there were persuasive reasons for
denying review under the Court's rule could, in most of them, be determined only by a close examination of the record. In any event, there
was a difference in the judgment of the justices in all of them.
Previous reference has been made to the difficulties connected with
the examination of the cases on the miscellaneous dockets in which
certiorari was denied. One case, however, is fairly well known and
warrants mention. In 1925 Tony Marino, at the time 18 years old
and a recent immigrant, unable to understand English, was arrested
and indicted in Illinois on a charge of murder. When he was brought
before the trial court the arresting officer served as an interpreter and
no attorney appeared in his behalf. He pleaded guilty and was summarily sentenced to life imprisonment. Twenty-two years later in 1947
Marino filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court
of Winnebago County seeking release on the ground that his constitutional rights had been violated at the time of sentence. The circuit
court quashed the writ and Marino then filed a petition in the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. At this point, the Attorney General of Illinois entered a confession of error and the Supreme Court, on the basis of this confession and "the undisputed facts"
120
described above, reversed and remanded in a per curiain opinion.
Justice Rutledge in a concurring opinion joined in by Justices Murphy
and Douglas stated that the case presented "a flagrant example of dep117. Kenosha Motor Coach Lines v. Public Service Commission, 254 Wis. 509, 37
N.W.2d 78, appeal dismissed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949) (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting). Kenosha brought an action to set aside an order of the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin, directing an electric railroad not part of a general steam
railway system and not owning or operating properties outside the State to restore an
abandoned connecting interstate freight service between points within Wisconsin. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a judgment setting aside the order on the grounds
that the Commission had jurisdiction since the federal government had not preempted
the field by the Interstate Commerce Act and the order was not discriminatory nor
did it interfere with interstate commerce.
118. Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879
(1949) (Justice Black dissenting). Flick was tried and convicted by a Four Power
Military Tribunal established in Germany to try war criminals. He then petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia challenging the validity of the sentence imposed. The court dismissed the
petition and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the tribunal, although
consisting entirely of Americans appointed by the United States military government,
was international since its power and jurisdiction arose out of the joint sovereignty of
the four victorious powers.
119. State v. Bridges, siupra note 114; People v. Perez, supra note 115; Ex parte
Quillian, supra note 116 and two cases the authors were not able to find; also one case
on the appellate docket in which a dissent was noted was not discovered.
120. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947). (The case was remanded because
the Attorney General stated that habeas corpus is the proper remedy in Illinois.)
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rivation of due process" 121 and went on to attack the complex Illinois
state procedure for affording relief in such cases. Justice Rutledge
complained that only in the few instances where a confession of error
was entered did the aggrieved petitioner have a chance to have the
wrong committed against him remedied. But the Justice was excessively optimistic. Upon remand, the circuit court held a hearing and
once more quashed the writ. Marino then sought another writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court which was denied over dissents by
Justices Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge.' 2 2 As his next move he filed
petitions for habeas corpus and a writ of error in the Illinois Supreme
Court, both of which were disposed of adversely to him in September
1949.123 For the third time Marino went to the Supreme Court of the
United States and certiorari was denied again. 2 ' The net result is
that although 9 Supreme Court justices went on record as recognizing
that Marino was denied "the due process of law which the 14th amendment requires," 12 and the Attorney General of Illinois agreed, after
25 years the unhappy petitioner presumably still remains behind prison
walls. The Supreme Court disposed of this situation with two words
for the record: "certiorari denied." It may be argued that certiorari
should have been granted at the 1948 term but it would Seem a sufficient
answer that the Court does not correct error by repeating it.
Of the long list of cases each term in which certiorari is denied, it
is certain that a large number never should have been brought to the
Court's attention. 2 ' This is not only true of cases on the miscellaneous dockets but applies, even if not to so great an extent, to those on
the appellate docket as well. In some, it is difficult to believe that a
competent attorney could sincerely believe that it was in his client's
interest to bear the heavy expense of a petition for certiorari. If consideration for the Court is due from members of its bar, then this alone
might restrain such appeals; furthermore one might suppose that the
negligible chance of success would deter most lawyers from seeking
121. Id. at 564.

122. Illinois ex rel. Marino v. Ragen, 336 U.S. 969 (1949).
37, 88 N.E.2d 8
123. 404 Ill. 35, 88 N.E.2d 7 (1949) (habeas corpus) ; 404 Ill.
(1949) (writ of error). The court held that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari
governed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus since the same record was presented
on both occasions. In the case of the petition for a writ of error, it was based on the
common law record alone in which it did not appear affirmatively that Marino was
not represented by counsel.
124. Illinois ex rel. Marino v. Ragen, 339 U.S. 921 (1950).
125. 332 U.S. 561, 562 (1947).
126. "During the past term of the Court only about 15% of the petitions for
certiorari were granted, and this figure itself is considerably higher than the average
in recent years. While a great many of the 85% that were denied were far from
frivolous, far too many reveal a serious misconception on the part of counsel concerning the role of the Supreme Court in our federal system." Chief Justice Vinson,
Work of the Federal Courts, an address before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7,
1949, printed in 70 Sup. Ct. XIII, XIV (1949).
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review of the issues in cases trivial from the view of national interest.
And yet, each year, the Justices and their clerks must consume valuable
time in examining extensive records in such cases. Here are a few
samples which, in the authors' judgment, readily fall into this category.
In Horn v. Chicago,12 an abutting property owner, claiming
damages from the construction of a viaduct by the city, felt aggrieved
by the application to his case of an Illinois five-year statute of limitations. He sought a review by the Supreme Court by appeal which was
dismissed or, if treated as a petition for a writ of certiorari, denied. 2 '
In Commissioners v. Russell,'2 9 it was held that the building and maintenance of a courthouse and jail over a period of 27 years was substantiaf compliance with conditions in a deed so as to avoid a forfeiture
where the deed failed to specify the period of compliance. Good Holding Co. v. Boswell,8 0 raised a run-of-the-mine question of malicious
prosecution. The manager of a business establishment reported to law
enforcement officers the findings of a detective agency accusing plaintiff, an employee, of theft. He omitted, however, to reveal other facts
wit1in his knowledge which threw grave doubt on the question of
plaintiff's guilt. In an action against him for malicious prosecution,
the question of malice was left to the jury which found against defendant. The court held, on appeal, that the evidence sustained the finding
and that the issuance of a warrant and filing of information against
accused neither negatived malice as a matter of law nor conclusively
established the existence of probable cause where the person responsible
for the proceedings failed to make a full and fair disclosure to the prosecuting authorities. In another case of malicious prosecution, the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that a compromise settlement by a defendant in a criminal prosecution estopped him from subsequently contending that the proceedings had been instituted without
probable cause. 8' In a case coming up from Kentucky,1 2 a Sewer
District wanted the Supreme Court to review a case in which the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky declined to apply a statute of the State in a
manner which pretty clearly would have amounted to the impairment
of a contract obligation or a taking of property without compensation.
And in a case from South Carolina, an action for wrongful death, it
was contended that the evidence on punitive damages was insufficient
127. 403 Ill. 549, 87 N.E.2d 642 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950).
128. Ibid.
129. 174 F.2d 778 (10th Cir), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 820 (1949).
130. 173 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 815 (1949).
131. Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,'339 U.S. 965
(1950).
132. Louisville and Jefferson County M. S. Dist. v. Bond Bros., 228 S.W.2d 655
(Ky. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 943 (1950).
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to support the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff and this raised a
question which the Supreme Court ought to decide.'
On the other hand, the judgment of men, whether Supreme Court
justices, practicing lawyers or Law School professors and students
varies to such an extent that the ultimate appraisal of a case is frequently not too obvious. For example, Justice Black recorded his dissent in Bernstein v. Ems,1 4 a case classified by the authors as "trivial."
It involved, on the face of it, a relatively elementary problem of tort
law. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had reversed a decision on a verdict rendered against a lessor of business premises in favor
of a business guest who had been hurt when a lighting fixture fell on
him. The court held that there was nothing in the record to show that
the defendant knew or by the exercise of reasonable care could have
discovered the defect, even if it were conceded that, as the trial judge
had held, the lessor had retained "control" over the ceiling and fixtures
in the lease between itself and its tenants. There appears to be no deviation from New York law contrary to the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
On the face of it, the case looks like dozens of other tort cases picked at
random out of almost any advance sheet. And yet, at least one of the
nine justices, after examining the record, thought it merited Supreme
Court consideration, notwithstanding the unanimous decision of one
of the most distinguished courts in the nation. Mr. Justice Black's
known respect for jury findings may explain his position.
A question may be important in the sense that it involves a question of policy which dearly affects our way of life or our institutions,
but still not be "important" in the sense that it makes a legitimate claim
upon the Supreme Court for decision. Saint Lo Construction Co. v.
Koenigsberger 3 is an example. Here plaintiff brought an action to
restrain defendant from building anything but a residential building on
property covered by a restrictive covenant. Prior to this action, defendant's predecessor in title had unsuccessfully sought to cancel the
covenant on the grounds that the neighborhood had changed. The
district court held, in the absence of new evidence on "change," that
the prior decision was conclusive and the injunction issued. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
Now here is a question of some importance. Judge Edgerton dissented on the ground that the legal validity of a restrictive covenant
did not necessarily require enforcement by injunction-a balancing of
133.
Sup. Ct.
134.
135.

Jennings v. McCowan, 215 S.C. 404, 55 S.E.2d 522 (1949), cert. denied, 70
494 (1950).
174 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 873 (1949).
174 F.2d 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 821 (1949).
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equities might call for denial of equitable relief although the aggrieved
landowner might be entitled to damages. The problem has broad policy
implications and has evoked considerable discussion. 36 But the further
question may be raised whether it -is the sort of case which the Supreme
Court should review. The authors classified the case as "important"
under the Rules of the Supreme Court relative to review of cases from
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. But a good argument could be made that that court might well be made the court of
last resort for such questions in so far as they arise in the District.
Certainly its dignity is comparable to that of the supreme courts of the
states.
So too in United States v. Walker,'37 it was held, by a divided
court, following the ancient common law rule, that a wife could not
testify against her husband without his consent in a criminal trial where
the offense was committed against a third person. The rule has been
abrogated in many states 138 and the Supreme Court has permitted a
wife to testify in favor of her husband,' 39 thus making a crack in the
theory of the "unity" of husband and wife. Although a conflict between decisions in the different circuits 140 would have afforded the
Supreme Court an excuse to review, had it so desired, it is not difficult
to maintain that the issue, though important, does not carry with it national significance of such magnitude as to require a grant of certiorari.
CONCLUSION

What of significance is suggested by this limited, and admittedly
inadequate look at the work which the Supreme Court did not do during the 1949 term? Here were more than a thousand litigants who
vainly sought review of their legal troubles by the Court. Many of
them are in jail and will remain there for years; some have been
executed. To be sure, from experience, from random sampling, from
confidence in the integrity and ability of the Court as an institution and
the justices who sit on it, we may be sure that a large number of these
cases had no merits which could conceivably justify review by the Supreme Court. Some of this litigation should never have been instituted
in the first place and much of it was carried so far as a petition for a
136. The principal case is commented on in 62 HARv. L. RaV. 1394 (1949). On
the general problem, see Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919, 33 HAv. L.
REv. 813, 821 (1920).
137. 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949).
138. See 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488, n. (3d ed.) and see 38 GEO. L.. 316 (1950).
139. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
140. Compare Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935) with Paul v.
United States, 79 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1935).
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writ of certiorari only because of the ignorance of the petitioner or the
incompetence or venality of his lawyer.
Nevertheless, 64 important cases is not a negligible number. Of
the many reasons which could have influenced the justices individually
or collectively to deny the petition in these cases, we shall never know
which ones in fact were persuasive. Indeed, in a large number of these
cases, it is impossible to determine what considerations indicating the
propriety of denial were present without reading the entire record and
doing over the work done by the justices and their law clerks. Hidden
away in the middle of the record might be the clue to a perfectly legitimate basis for denying the petition. It is certain that one cannot state
the absence of such basis merely from reading the opinion of the court
below.
But when all allowances are made and every consideration
weighed, one can scarcely avoid a troubled feeling about the 64 cases.
Take Lapides, Trumbo, Stuyvesant Town, the Baltimore Radio Show.
These cases raised the most vital constitutional problems that could be
presented to any court in a democratic country. But it was impossible
to get them reviewed by the Supreme Court. Whatever the reasons,
one obvious question almost shouts for an answer: Can any reason be
adequate to justify the Court's failure to face these questions and settle
them?
In a highly confused and mixed up world where much of it is run
on the principle of the jungle, it may be that an important need for the
nation claiming the top rung of the democratic ladder is one of institutional soul-searching self-analysis, by the Supreme Court, the Congress
which is supposed to be the champion of the common man, and perhaps
even by the latter himself. In any form of government, there must be
a last word some place. A big government is necessarily a complicated
one and an awful lot of little people get hurt in the shuffle. We cannot
expect from one government agency of nine men and a very small staff
complete review of the legal troubles of every one of our hundred and
fifty million people who ask for it. But it is disconcerting when the
Court will review a controversy over a patent on a pin ball machine 14'
while one man is deprived of his citizenship and another of his liberty
without Supreme Court review of a plausible challenge to the validity
of government action. What we can hope for, reasonably, is that when
a little man raises a big issue, that issue will, at least, get the judicial
consideration which its importance deserves. It is bad if the issue is
resolved the wrong way. But on highly controversial issues, the judg141. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267 (1949), decision below, 170 F.2d 34, cert.
granted, 336 U.S. 935 (1949).
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ment of men will differ and that is one reason we have the Supreme
Court. What is very bad indeed is the silent treatment by the Court
of an issue which is obviously one'of far-reaching public concern.
Perhaps the most startling fact from the breakdown of the denials
of certiorari on the appellate docket is the large number of civil rights
cases and the large proportion of them which may reasonably be classified as important. Of the civil rights cases which the Court did review,
15 were decided by a divided court. In 14 of the 15 the asserted right
was denied. This "broad jump to the right" is described by Professor
Frank as "the most important new development of the year." The
record on denials appears to confirm the conclusion of the "broad
jump." One may speculate as to the results of the 15 civil rights cases
in which the Court divided if Justices Rutledge and Murphy had lived
and Justice Douglas not been absent most of the term. A similar
speculation is permissible as to the 27 denials of important civil rights
cases. The speculation has point in the light of the voting record of the
two new justices in the civil rights cases in which they participated. 1 2
It would appear that the Court's practice in handling certiorari
problems raises several rather specific questions of which the following
are samples:
(1) Should the Court be accorded such wide powers in controlling its business?
(2) Should the Court deny certiorari without giving its reasons,
however briefly?
(3) Should the Court deny certiorari if the case involves an important question, regardless of other considerations which suggest
denial?
(4) Are there not preferable ways of regulating the flow of work
of the Court and thus reducing its work to manageable limits, for example:
(a) by shutting off all FELA and bankruptcy cases except
perhaps where there are conflicts between the circuits;
(b) by re-examining the basis and reasons for diversity
jurisdiction with a view to eliminating petitions to the Supreme
Court in such cases and making the Courts of Appeal the final
court for the various contract, tort, stockholders' family squabbles,
and other garden variety litigation that clogs the dockets under
diversity jurisdiction;
142. Professor Frank's box score shows Clark voting against the claimed right
877 of the time, Minton, 80%. See 18 U. OF C i. L. REv. 1, 38 (1950).
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(c) by devising some method for disciplining attorneys for
filing obviously frivolous petitions, if only by admonition in
specific cases, thus exposing the offender to the professional embarrassment which he deserves.
(5) Should the Court be enlarged?
In 1928, (then) Professor Frankfurter commented on the Judiciary Act of 1925: "A change so drastic as that wrought by the new Act
in the discretionary powers of the Court must await its vindication
from actual practice." 143 It is by no means clear that the actual practice during the 1949 term has done so.
143. FRANKFURTER
287 (1928).
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